The economic literature has provided abundant analysis on how taxes, government expenditure and government balance should be set over the business cycle for fiscal policy to be considered optimal and sustainable. However, experience presents ample evidence that such policies were in practice not always pursued by policymakers. Examples of sub-optimal policies are the increases of debt ratios over recent decades in several developed economies and the observed tendency of governments to conduct procyclical fiscal policies, notably in good times.
It is today widely recognised that adequate institutional settings (fiscal rules and institutions) at national level can play an important role in ensuring an appropriate use of discretion in the conduct of fiscal policy. In the context of the discussions on the 2005 reform of the SGP, the Council has emphasized the importance of strengthening fiscal governance in the EU Member States. The Council stated notably that national budgetary rules should be complementary to the Member States' commitments under the Stability and Growth Pact. The Council also underlined that domestic governance arrangements should complement the EU framework, and that national institutions could play a more prominent role in budgetary surveillance.
The workshop aims at improving the understanding of the role of national budgetary rules and institutions in shaping fiscal policy. The contributions will notably assess whether there is empirical evidence that institutional settings at national level influence budgetary outcomes. It will also be discussed what are the desirable characteristics of national institutional settings to ensure an appropriate use of discretion in the conduct of fiscal policies. Specific questions concern whether these characteristics depend on country-specific features like, for instance, the electoral system, the institutional organisation (unified vs. federal countries) and the size of the country. Other interesting issues concern the reasons for the resistance of policy-makers to the introduction of adequate fiscal institutional settings and whether there is a case for delegation of part of fiscal policy to independent institutions. 
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